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Introduction
The defund the police movement has gained major traction over the past eleven months
in the United States. Since Derek Chauvin, a Minneapolis police officer, killed George Floyd ,
racial equality has taken a front seat in many Americans’ minds.1 However, despite the progress
that communities in this country have made over the past eleven months, there is a huge
constitutional issue lurking in the distance that not many people are thinking about. This paper
will analyze the inevitable juxtaposition between the defund the police movement’s goals and the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This paper will argue that the defund the
police movement will not be enough to address racial inequality and injustices. Major changes
will need to happen at the federal level, including with the Fourth Amendment, for these
injustices to be properly addressed.
This paper will be broken down into four parts. The first part will examine the defund the
police movement’s history, growth, and goals. The second part will analyze the defund the police
movement in different cities across the country since George Floyd’s death. The third part will
analyze Fourth Amendment case law from the United States Supreme Court and the Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The fourth part will discuss the impending conflict between the defund the
police movement and the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment will still allow law enforcement officers to carry out their duties
as they always have even if police departments lose funding, resources, or employees. Law
enforcement officers will be able to continue these actions because there are exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. These issues will be most prevalent in emergency aid

1

See Alex Altman, Why The Killing of George Floyd Sparked an American Uprising , TIME M AGAZINE (June 4,
2020, 6:49 AM), https://time.com/5847967/george-floyd-protests-trump/ (describing the events leading up to
George Floyd’s death and its aftermath).
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and community caretaking situations. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s knock and announce
doctrine and use of force doctrine will still allow law enforcement officers to continue their
current routines.
While the defund the police movement has legitimate goals that should be addressed by
lawmakers in this country, the movement will not solve some of the injustices that have plagued
this country for centuries. The movement’s goals will not solve the ultimate issues with racial
inequality unless State Congresses or the United States Congress pass new laws that regulate
police conduct, or the Supreme Court reverses extensive Fourth Amendment case law. Law
enforcement officers will still have the same authority to respond to situations under the Fourth
Amendment even if the departments that employ them are given less funding or employ fewer
officers.
I.

The Defund the Police Movement’s History, Growth, and Goals
A. History

Most people probably heard the message “defund the police” in the aftermath of George
Floyd’s death. However, defunding the police is not a new idea that was created in 2020. 2
Communities and advocacy groups have made efforts for years to defund law enforcement
agencies and prisons.3 There have been many highly publicized police killings over the last
decade, including George Floyd in 2020 and Michael Brown in 2014. 4 The idea that the only
way to reform police activity is to decrease the number of police officers and defund police

See Sam Levin, What does ‘defund the police’ mean? The rallying cry sweeping the US – explained, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/05/defunding-the-police-uswhat-does-it-mean (describing how the idea to defund the police has been around for years).
3 See id.
4 See Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 C ALIF. L. R EV. 1781, 1782-83 (2020)
(discussing how outrage against police killings has been around for years going back to the Michael Brown shooting
in 2014).
2

2

departments is not unique to 2020 and 2021.5 Although the defund the police movement is this
paper’s focus, the prison abolition movement is relevant to the defund the police movement’s
origins.
The prison abolition movement began in the 1980s after the War on Drugs was declared.6
Some argue that the War on Drugs is the root of the mass incarceration issue in this country.7
Author Michelle Alexander wrote a book about how the War on Drugs is the single cause of this
country’s mass incarceration issue.8 The prison abolition movement’s main goal “is to reform the
criminal justice system and to offer alternatives to incarceration for those who commit a crime.” 9
Some alternatives that the prison abolition movement has focused on are effective drug treatment
programs, providing better resources for those incarcerated to find work or education while in
prison or after being released, and doing volunteer work. 10 The abolition movement and its
focus—that the criminal justice and prison systems should not be based on retribution—continue
to grow to this day.11 The prison abolition movement also aims to make the public aware of the
racial inequality that exists in prisons.12

5

See id. at 1783 (supporting the idea to defund or abolish police to remedy racial injustices).
See Tiana Smith, The Prison Abolition Movement (1985- ), BLACKPAST.ORG (March 12, 2018),
https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/prison-abolition-movement-1985/ (explaining the prison
abolition movement’s origins).
7 See id. (describing statistics showing the exponential growth of the U.S. prison population since the War on Drugs
was declared).
8 See generally M ICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM C ROW: M ASS I NCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 60 (New Press Revised edition) (2012).
9 See Smith, supra note 6.
10 See id.
11 See Bill Keller, What Do Abolitionists Really Want?, THE M ARSHALL PROJECT (June 13, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/06/13/what-do-abolitionists-really-want (explaining abolitionist views that
the system is “inherently racist and based on retribution”).
12 See Smith, supra note 6 (explaining the Prison Abolition Movement’s intent to make the public aware of racially
disproportionate incarceration and the impact it has on communities of color).
6
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People have argued for police abolition before 2020.13 According to Rachel Herzing, a
prominent police abolitionist, the police abolition movement’s ultimate goal is eliminating the
use of police.14 Abolitionists, such as Herzing, argue that the one way to combat the racial
inequalities in the criminal justice system is to decrease the number of police officers and
prisons.15
Police abolition and prison abolition can work hand-in-hand to achieve each movement’s
respective goals. One of the abolition movement’s objectives that would benefit both the police
and prison abolition movements is that local communities should have more responsibility in
ensuring public safety.16 Abolishing police and prisons may seem like radical ideas to some, but
to others, they reimagine the state itself with more equality for all races. 17 The police and prison
abolition movements can fight the overcriminalization problem in this country that “leads to
mass incarceration, undermines race relations, and ultimately keeps more people in poverty.”18
Inequality in policing leads to inequality in prisons since the first step in going to prison is being
arrested by the police. This is illustrated by the fact that African-Americans compose “13 percent
of the U.S. population, but account for almost 40 percent of [prison] inmates.” 19 The prison and

13

See Akbar, supra note 4, at 1783-85 (discussing how police abolition has garnered support in the years following
Michael Brown’s death in 2014 and then multiplied following George Floyd’s death in 2020).
14 See Fabiola Cineas, What the public is getting right—and wrong—about police abolition, VOX M EDIA (October
30, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/21529335/abolish-the-police-movement (interviewing police
abolitionist, Rachel Herzing, about the police abolition movement and how it can be used to take steps toward racial
equality in the United States).
15 See Akbar, supra note 4, at 1783.
16 See Keller, supra note 11 (explaining two main objectives abolitionists have: “devolving responsibility for public
safety to local communities” and “to redistribute government spending from police and prisons to narrowing the
underlying, crime-breeding inequalities of wealth and opportunity”).
17 See Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U.L. R EV. 405, 410 (2018) (explaining the
article’s premise as reimagining the state of the country’s laws through social movements that can be classified as
“radical”).
18 See Charles G. Koch & Mark V. Holden, The Overcriminalization of America, POLITICO (January 7, 2015),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/overcriminalization -of-america -113991/ (explaining the snowball
effects that overcriminalization has had on minorities, the prison population, and race relations in the United States).
19 See id.
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police abolition movements have laid the groundwork for the defund the police movement to
grow in the aftermath of George Floyd’s death. The defund the police movement shares goals
with the prison and police abolition movements, but it does not go to the extremes as its
historical antecedents.
B. Goals for Reform
Over the past eleven months, people have conflated the meaning of “defund the police”
with abolishing the police.20 As discussed above, some groups have advocated for abolishing the
police, while others seek smaller reductions in police funding. 21 However, “defund” simply
means “reallocating or redirecting funding away from the police department to other government
agencies funded by the local municipality.”22 The defund the police movement’s basic goals
want to focus government public safety spending on different priorities than police spending.23
Some demands to defund the police have coincided with giving communities the control to
define and spend on public safety as opposed to the government making those decisions. 24 In
Chicago, activists have written that “[w]ithout taking power away from the police and the state
systems that operate in complicity, nothing will change.” 25

See Rashawn Ray, What does ‘defund the police’ mean and does it have merit? , THE BROOKINGS I NSTITUTE (June
19, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/19/what-does-defund-the-police-mean-and-does-it-havemerit/ (arguing that “defund the police” does not mean the same thing as abolishing the police).
21 See Levin, supra note 2 (explaining the difference between groups seeking to defund the police and groups
seeking to abolish the police).
22 See Ray, supra note 20 (defining “defund” as it pertains to the defund the police movement).
23 See Levin, supra note 2 (outlining alternatives to police spending that government budgets should focus on
pertaining to “public safety”).
24 See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 781 (2021) (explaining that
some demands to defund the police are combined with demands to “have the people decide how budgets are
allocated, and to give communities control over how to define public safety”).
25 See id. (quoting activists in Chicago who proposed a bill to form the “Civilian Police Accountability Council
(CPAC)” to give the community more control and take control away from the police and state).
20
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The Movement for Black Lives (“M4BL”) is an activist organization that supports
defunding the police.26 M4BL has called for divesting police budgets and reinvesting in
“healthcare, housing, and education in Black communities.” 27 M4BL wants the defunding efforts
to span local, state, and federal governments to “move money away from policing and the
military toward other areas of government that have long been drained of resources.” 28 The main
argument is that problems such as “racial disparities, injustice, and police violence” are not
addressed through investing in the police and prisons.29
While taking funding away from police departments or removing officers from police
departments are some of defund the police’s main goals, another goal for reform focuses on
building trust between the communities and the officers who patrol those communities. 30 Not
only would this address some of the inequalities in policing, but it could also “enhance the
legitimacy of the police.”31 Legal scholars have embraced the defund the police movement’s
ideas to achieve equality in the state’s role in policing. 32 Although there are skeptics who think
defunding the police could have negative consequences, some still believe that changes should
be made to how policing is carried out.33 One way to do this could be to allocate some of the

26

THE M OVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://m4bl.org/defund-the-police/ (last visited March 22, 2021) (outlining
the Movement’s purpose and objectives towards defunding the police).
27 See Emily Weyrauch, A Movement Grows to Defund the Police and Invest in Communities Instead, NONPROFIT
QUARTERLY (June 5, 2020), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/a -movement-grows-to-defund-the-police-and-invest-incommunities-instead/ (describing the defund the police movement’s growth and M4BL’s main goals to reinvest
money that originally went to police departments).
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See Simonson, supra note 24, at 783-84 (describing a second way to reform the police by creating trust between
the community and the police).
31 See id.
32 See id. at 785 (listing legal scholars who have argued that “transformative change is necessary . . . to realize
legitimate, fair, and equal means through which the state can provide security”).
33 See Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski, Police Funding, 72 FLA. L. R EV. 277, 285 (2020) (arguing that despite
the possibility of negative consequences to defunding police departments, such as increases in crime rates, police
budgets could still be reimagined and changes could be made in a positive way).
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police budget to continued police training and accountability. 34 This idea could marry the defund
the police movement’s community spending goal with better police training to achieve more
equality.
As time passes, the defund the police movement’s future could be uncertain and lose
momentum and support.35 Despite this uncertain future, some cities across the country have
taken affirmative steps to decrease police funding and the number of officers employed by police
departments.36 On the federal scale, Congress has also taken steps to potentially assist in
achieving racial equality and some of defund the police’s goals through the George Floyd Justice
in Policing Act.37 The Act does not per se “defund the police,” but it does address policing
tactics, such as banning chokeholds and qualified immunity. 38 On March 3, 2021, the House
voted to pass the Act, but it is unlikely that it will pass in the Senate.39 Whether there are any
challenges to these federal, state, city, or municipal actions are yet to be seen, the fact that
lawmakers across the country are taking action to defund the police is a step in the right direction
to achieve racial equality.

See id. at 328 (explaining that the article’s proposal to require communities to “allocate a specified percentage of
their policing budget to training and accountability” could face pushback, but could have positive benefits to the
communities).
35 See Cineas, supra note 14 (explaining that as the calendar moves further away from the date of George Floyd’s
death, polls have shown that support for the Black Lives Matter and defund the police movement have dropped).
36 See Jemima McEvoy, At Least 13 Cities Are Defunding Their Police Departments, FORBES (August 13, 2020,
3:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2020/08/13/at-least-13-cities-are-defunding-their-policedepartments/?sh=20766f8c29e3 (stating that cities have begun to take affirmative steps to defund their police
departments).
37 See Stacy M. Allen, Law Enforcement: “Daddy Changed the World”: How the Death of George Floyd May
Impact the Law, 58 H OUSTON LAWYER 18 (2020) (outlining the proposed George Floyd Justice in Policing Act in
the House of Representatives from June 8, 2020).
38 See Padmananda Rama & Will Weissert, House passes George Floyd Act as Democrats avoid ‘defund the police’
clash, PBS NEWSH OUR (March 4, 2021, 7:53PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/house-passes-georgefloyd-act-as-democrats-avoid-defund-the-police-clash (describing the Act’s terms, the House Democrats’ efforts to
pass the Act, and the uphill battle the House Democrats face in needing sixty votes for the Act to pass in the Senate).
39 See id.
34
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II.

The Defund the Police Movement Across America Post-May 2020
A. Introduction

As of August 12, 2020, at least thirteen U.S. cities have embraced the defund the police
movement in some manner.40 The main actions that city councils across the U.S. have taken are
decreasing city police department budgets or decreasing the number of police officers employed
by the city.41 Overall, since George Floyd’s death, over thirty states have taken action to either
defund the police or pass police reform laws. 42 There has been no concrete consistency between
the amount of money or percentage of the funding that has been decreased from city police
department budgets across the country.43 These cities have also taken steps to defund the police
despite the majority of Americans not having a favorable view of the movement. 44 Although
there has been a surge in crime in cities across the country over the past eleven months, these
cities are still taking steps to defund the police.45 More alarmingly, the crime surge can be
attributed to homicide spikes in cities across the country. 46 This part will examine four major
cities across the country that have taken affirmative steps to defund the police, and to illustrate

40

See McEvoy, supra note 36.
See id. (explaining that cities have either cut funding from police department budgets or decreased the number of
officers employed by the city).
42 See Steve Eder et al., As New Police Reform Laws Sweep Across the U.S., Some Ask: Are They Enough? , N.Y.
TIMES (April 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/18/us/police-reformbills.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage (stating that thirty sta tes have passed over “140 new
police oversight and reform laws”).
43 See Fola Akinnibi et al., Cities Say They Want to Defund the police. Their Budgets Say Otherwise., B LOOMBERG
(January 12, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-city-budget-police-funding/ (outlining different
statistics between different cities on how much those cities have either increased or decreased police spending).
44 See McEvoy, supra note 36 (stating that according to an Axios-Survey Monkey poll, only 34% of Americans have
a favorable view of the defund the police movement, while 53% do not).
45 See Julian Baron, How ‘defund the police’ has taken shape across the country, FOX B ALTIMORE (November 12,
2020), https://foxbaltimore.com/account/nationwide-cities-cut-police-defund-the-police (outlining statistics showing
surges in crime rates in major cities across the country amid these cities taking steps to decrease police funding).
46 See Paul G. Cassell, Explaining the Recent Homicide Spikes in U.S. Cities: The “Minneapolis Effect” and the
Decline in Proactive Policing, 33 FED. SENT. R. 83 (2020) (explaining that major cities have suffered “dramatic
increases in homicides” suddenly as cities have embraced the defund the police movement).
41
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the manner in which the movement has attempted to make its goals a reality. These cities are
Minneapolis, Seattle, New York City, and Los Angeles.
B. Case Study: Minneapolis, MN
It can be argued that the people of Minneapolis were the initial driving force behind the
defund the police movement. George Floyd was killed by a Minneapolis police officer on May
25, 2020, and the protests to defund the police started almost immediately after. 47 The
Minneapolis city council originally pledged to disband the city’s police department at the height
of the protests.48 However, the city council has since backed down from this position and instead
made much smaller budget cuts.49 In December 2020, the Minneapolis city council voted to shift
roughly $8 million from the police department budget to expand other services. 50 Even with the
city council’s lofty original goals, the $8 million cut was a minuscule 4.5 percent of the total
police budget.51 The city council even faced threats from the mayor that he would veto the
proposed budget if it voted to cut the number of officers on the force. 52 As a result, the city
council’s original plan to disband the city’s police department entirely was reduced to keeping
the police department staffed at its current levels.53

47

See Altman, supra note 1.
See McEvoy, supra note 36 (explaining the Minneapolis city council’s original plan s to disband the city’s entire
police department).
49 See Avie Schneider, Minneapolis Shifts $8 Million in Police Funding, But Keeps Force At Current Level ,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (December 10, 2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/10/944938471/minneapolisshifts-8-million-in-police-funding-but-keeps-force-at-current-level (stating the Minneapolis City Council’s final
decision to decrease police spending by almost $8 million despite original plans to disband the city’s police
department altogether).
50 See id.
51 See id. (explaining that the $8 million budget cut “is a small part of the overall police budget of $179 million”).
52 See id. (explaining that Minneapolis Mayor, Jacob Frey, said he might veto the city’s proposed budget if the city
council voted to decrease the number of officers in the department from 888 to 750, starting in 2022, so the City
Council decided not to lay-off officers due to this threat).
53 See id. (stating that the City Council voted to keep the department staffed at its current level to the dismay of the
city’s council and residents).
48
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It is hard to pinpoint a particular reason why the Minneapolis city council’s original plans
to eliminate the city’s police department were reduced to a 4.5 percent budget cut.54 However,
the city’s drastic spike in homicides and surge in violent crime has posed a public safety issue for
the city council and the mayor.55 The homicide spike’s timing could have a direct correlation to
the City Council’s change of course.56
C. Case Study: Seattle, WA
Seattle’s City Council has taken a similar route as Minneapolis has to defund its police
department’s budget.57 Originally, Seattle’s city council committed to cutting its police
department’s budget by 50 percent.58 However, the city council ended up decreasing the police
department’s budget by only 11.2 percent.59 Before settling on the 11.2 percent cut to the police
department, Seattle’s city council voted to decrease the salaries of the police department’s chief
of police, members of the chief’s command staff, and to decrease the department’s size by about
100 officers.60 Another similarity to Minneapolis is that Seattle’s mayor actually vetoed the city
council’s proposed budget cut because the budget did not “sufficiently look at the issues of
public safety.”61

54

See id.
See Baron, supra note 45 (publishing statistics showing that despite the Minneapolis City Council’s decision to
reduce the police department’s budget there has been a 152% increase in homicides since 2019 as well as a 23%
increase in violent crime since 2019).
56 See Cassell, supra note 46 (arguing that the timing of the homicide “spike following the start of the George Floyd
protests is readily and starkly apparent”).
57 See Akinnibi et al., supra note 43 (explaining that Seattle and Minneapolis had to pau se or decrease the original
plans to defund each city’s police departments).
58 See Hallie Golden, Defund the police: can other cities learn from Seattle’s stumbling blocks? , THE GUARDIAN
(August 23, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/22/seattle-police-department-defundreform (stating that Seattle’s city council had a “veto-proof majority” of its council members to cut the city police
department’s budget by 50%).
59 See Akinnibi et al., supra note 43 (depicting bar graph displaying what percentage that cities have cut from their
police budgets).
60 See Golden, supra note 58 (stating the ultimate actions that the Seattle City Council took instead of the originally
proposed 50 percent budget cut. As a result of these cuts, Seattle’s police chief, Carmen Best, the city’s first African
American chief of police, announced her retirement only hours after the vote).
61 See id.
55
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Ultimately, Seattle “went a step further” with their budget cuts than other major cities.62
Seattle decreased its police department’s funding and also allocated $30 million to “a
participatory budgeting process that will give everyday people a say in how the money should be
used.”63 Some of this $30 million came directly from the money that was once given to the city’s
police department.64 The Seattle City Council Insight has explained that the $30 million will be
used to focus on five particular areas: “housing and physical space, mental health, youth, crisis
and wellness, and economic development.”65 Within these five focus areas, the city will strive to
increase Black-led and Black-owned property and to address other cultural barriers that Black
men and women face pertaining to economic development.66
D. Case Study: New York, NY
New York City decided to cut more money from its police department’s budget than any
other city.67 During last summer’s protests in New York City, the city’s officials agreed to
defund the police by slashing $1 billion from the department’s $6 billion budget, which equates
to a 16.7 percent budget cut.68 The city also canceled the incoming police academy class which

62

See Manjeet Kaur, Seattle Cut Its Police Budget. Now The Public Will Decide How To Spend The Money , THE
APPEAL (January 28, 2021), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/seattle-participatory-budgeting-defund-police/
(describing steps that Seattle’s city council took in addition to cutting money from its police department’s budget).
63 See id.
64 See id. (explaining that $12 million of the $30 million allocated to the participatory budgeting process was
diverted directly from Seattle’s police department and that the other $18 million came from the Mayor’s “Equitable
Communities Initiative Fund, which is sourced from cuts to several departments and new taxes”).
65 See Steve Dubb, Seattle Launches $30 Million Participatory Budgeting Process, NONPROFIT QUARTERLY
(February 5, 2021), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/seattle-launches-30-million-participatory-budgeting-process/
(explaining Seattle’s plan for its $30 million participatory budgeting process and specific steps the city council and
other organizations will take to carry out this plan).
66 See id.
67 See McEvoy, supra note 36 (stating the amount of money that thirteen cities have cut from their police department
budgets, and that New York City’s $1 billion decrease is more than any other city had decreased as of the date that
the article was written).
68 See Jeffrey C. Mays & Dana Rubinstein, Nearly $1 Billion Is Shifted From Police in Budget That Pleases No One ,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020, updated August 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/nyregion/nypdbudget.html (explaining that New York City’s city council shifted roughly $1 billion from its police department and
implemented a hiring freeze to “placate calls to defund the police”).
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limited the department’s growth.69 However, people in New York City are not pleased with the
direction that the city officials took.70 Critics claimed that these cuts were “nothing more than
smoke and mirrors.”71 These claims were based on the $1 billion budget cut actually being a
reallocation of police funds “under the guise of a budget cut.” 72 A community activist in New
York stated that the budget cuts did not go far enough “and simply shifted officers to different
agencies.”73 For example, instead of using officers from the New York Police Department
(“NYPD”) in schools, the Department of Education would assume command of school officers
instead.74 This does not get rid of officers in schools, it only shifts them to a different agency.
These budget cuts came at the same time that crime rates were increasing in the city.75
New York City has fallen into a similar situation as the other cities discussed in this part.
At first, the city leadership embraced defunding the police, but as time has passed, that embrace
has seemed to fade.76 As the New York City 2021 mayoral primary has neared , some of the

69

See id. (stating that the city planned to hire an additional 1,160 officers, but instead canceled the mass hiring and
instead decided to shift “monitoring of illegal vending, homeless people on the streets and school safety away from
the police).
70 See id. (arguing that the details of the city council’s budget “seemed to please no one” and that even the city
council’s vote itself was not as smooth as usual, citing a vote of 32 -17 in favor of the proposed budget).
71 See id. (quoting Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez who said, “Defunding police mea ns defunding, . . . It does not
mean budget tricks or funny math”).
72 See Baron, supra note 45 (quoting a spokesperson for Communities United for Police Reform who accused the
Mayor and the City Council Speaker of deceiving the public by “using funny math and budget tricks to try to
mislead New Yorkers into thinking that they plan to meet the movement’s demands for at least $1B in direct cuts”).
73 See Ivan Pereira, NYC cuts $1B from police budget amid calls for reform, ABC NEWS (July 1, 2020, 2:15PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/nyc-cuts-1b-police-budget-amid-calls-reform/story?id=71552471 (describing backlash
that New York’s Mayor and City Council received from police supporters, President Trump, and police reform
activists after the $1 billion cut from the NYPD’s budget).
74 See id.
75 See Baron, supra note 45 (stating that the budget cuts have occurred despite homicides increasing by 38% and
shooting incidents increasing by 100% compared to the same time of year as in 2019); see also Cassell, supra note
46 (arguing that homicides and shootings are skyrocketing in New York City after the George Floyd protests).
76 See Emma G. Fitzsimmons & Jeffrey C. Mays, They Supported ‘Defund the Police.’ Then the Mayoral Campaign
Began., N.Y. TIMES (February 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/nyregion/defund-police-new-yorkmayor.html (arguing that many of the candidates running in the Democratic New York City mayoral primary in
2021 have begun to significantly distance themselves from the defund the police movement).
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candidates have distanced themselves from the defund the police movement. 77 As discussed
above, this may be due to how citizens view the meaning of “defund.”78 Other candidates are
concerned that defunding the police would make the city less safe and worsen crime. 79
Another reform that New York City’s city council made was ending qualified immunity
for NYPD officers.80 New York City is the first city to make this change. 81 While officers
themselves will not be held financially liable for alleged constitutional violations, the NYPD and
the city will be.82 New York City’s city council made this decision to address the “nation’s
systemic racism,” which is one of defund the police’s main goals. 83 Although ending qualified
immunity is not per se defunding the police, it does address the movement’s other goals.
E. Case Study: Los Angeles, CA
In Los Angeles, the defund the police movement and the prison abolition movement
appear to be more intertwined than in other cities. Los Angeles reallocated $150 million away
from police funding to its communities of color in July 2020. 84 Despite the $150 million budget

77

See id. (citing examples of mayoral candidates distancing themselves from defund the police, specifically: Scott
M. Stringer, who stood in Brooklyn at a protest in June 2020 stating, “It’s time to defund the N.Y.P.D. now” but has
since reversed course proposing only a $1 billion cut spread over four years; and Maya Wiley, who wants people “to
avoid using the defund slogan”).
78 See id. (quoting Maya Wiley stating “The word [‘defund’] means different things to different people . . . We
should focus on the clarity of the demands”).
79 See id. (arguing that the issue of mayoral candidates distancing themselves from the defund the police mov ement
“cuts across racial and class lines,” citing specific examples including, Eric Adams and Raymond J. McGuire, two
“Black moderate Democratic candidates” who have voiced concerns that “defunding the police would worsen crime
in neighborhoods that suffer the most from violence”).
80 See Luke Barr, New York City moves to end qualified immunity, making it the 1st city in US to do so , ABC NEWS
(March 29, 2021, 4:47PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/york-city-moves-end-qualified-immunity-making1st/story?id=76752098 (describing New York City’s actions to end qualified immunity, including the Mayor’s
reasons for supporting the public’s demands).
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See Akinnibi et al., supra note 43 (depicting the Los Angeles city council’s police department budget cuts in a
figure showing that of the $150 million taken from the LAPD: $10 million would go to Summer Youth Programs
and Workforce Development; $10 million would go to city reserve funds; $40 million would avoid furloughs for
city employees; and, of the $90 million unallocated funds, $ 88.8 would be proposed funds distributed to the highest
need city council districts, and the other $1.2 million would go to the Civil and Human Rights Department).
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cut, the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) still has roughly $3 billion at its disposal.85
This is approximately a 5 percent budget cut. These budget cuts were not enough for some
protestors in Los Angeles who want the LAPD to be abolished entirely. 86 If Los Angeles were to
cut the same amount from its police budget every year, then Black Lives Matter-Los Angeles and
other city members “would not reach their target for defunding the LAPD until 2040.” 87 People
still advocate for the LAPD’s abolition despite an increase in homicides and shootings in the
city.88
Los Angeles, like Seattle, also put some power into the hands of the city’s residents. In
November 2020, Los Angeles voters approved “Measure J.” 89 Measure J “requires that 10
percent of the city’s unrestricted general funds . . . be invested in social services and alternatives
to incarceration, not prisons and policing.”90 This reaches some defund the police and prison
abolition movement goals. Although Measure J is not a direct initiative to defund the police, it
aligns with the defund the police movement’s goals to divert funds from its police and prison
spending to communities and public health.91

See David Zahniser et al., Defund the LAPD? At this pace, it would take 20 years to hit Bl ack Lives Matter’s goal,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (August 11, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-08-11/defundlapd-la-budget-spending-priorities (explaining that despite the city council’s $150 million budget cut, LAPD
spending would still be around $3 billion, which accounts for 51% of the city’s “unrestricted” revenue).
86 See id. (quoting filmmaker Carter Moon who stated, “We want the dismantling of the LAPD entirely . . . We are
working toward abolition, and every day [the city council is] just getting in our way”).
87 See id. (arguing that despite the $150 million budget cut, abolition would not be reached until the year 2040 if the
same amount was cut from the budget each year, and that police abolition is most likely “legally impossible” in Los
Angeles because nearly 25 percent of the city’s police spending is the city’s financial obligation to pay officers’
pensions).
88 See Baron, supra note 45 (displaying statistics showing that Los Angeles has seen a 25 percent increase in
homicides and a 28 percent increase in shootings compared to 2019).
89 See Roge Karma, Los Angeles voters just delivered a huge win for the defund the poli ce movement, VOX M EDIA
(November 4, 2020, 4:27 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/11/4/21549019/measure-j-police-abolition-defundreform-black-lives-matter-protest-2020-election-george-floyd (explaining that the “Yes on J” campaign “flipped the
message from defunding cops to investing in everything else,” which led to voters adopting Measure J which would
require roughly between $360 million and $900 million per year to be invested in alternatives to prisons and
policing).
90 See id.
91 See id.
85
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F. The Fourth Amendment Hurdle
Many cities have committed to reform since George Floyd’s death.92 These reforms have
taken many different shapes and sizes throughout the country. 93 However, given the actions
already taken by cities and potential future actions, these measures exist against a constitutional
backdrop that has not yet changed. The Fourth Amendment is the roadblock that poses huge
questions for the defund the police movement. Despite the efforts that have already been taken
by activists and city councils to cut back police funding or decrease the size of police
departments, the Fourth Amendment remains unchanged when it comes to the police’s ability to
respond to crime or emergencies.
III.

What Does the Fourth Amendment Allow Law Enforcement Officers to Do?
A. The Fourth Amendment and “Reasonableness”
The Fourth Amendment governs law enforcement officer conduct pertaining to

unreasonable searches and seizures and requires the issuance of warrants based on probable
cause.94 Despite this constitutional requirement, the Supreme Court of the United States has
created exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.95 Thus, in certain situations,
law enforcement officers may conduct searches of persons, their effects, or places, or seize
persons without using a search or arrest warrant. These exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement will pose issues for the defund the police movement’s ultimate goals. More
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See McEvoy, supra note 36.
See id.
94 U.S. C ONST . amend. IV (stating “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized”).
95 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that despite the Fourth Amendment mandate that
warrantless searched are per se unreasonable, some warrantless searches are acceptable under a few “specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions”; quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963);
quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)).
93
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specifically, under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the injustices
that defund the police seek to remedy could be hindered by the emergency aid and community
caretaking doctrines.
Reasonableness is one of the main factors in most Fourth Amendment police conduct
inquiries. This may not be more evident than in the case of Terry stops and frisks. In the
landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers can search
and seize—or stop and frisk—citizens without probable cause.96 The reasonable suspicion
standard established under Terry is a relatively low standard for officers to satisfy as explained
by the Court’s rationale for allowing this officer conduct. 97 While reasonable suspicion is not the
standard in most Fourth Amendment contexts, objective reasonableness is the main inquiry that
courts undertake in analyzing the exceptions to the warrant requirement, knock and announce
doctrine, and officer use of force.
B. Exigent Circumstances and Emergency Aid Exceptions
Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States has identified three situations that qualify
as exigent circumstances: (1) hot pursuit of a suspect; (2) to avoid the destruction of evidence;
and (3) the emergency aid exception to prevent harm or protect persons from threat or danger.98
The situation most relevant to defund the police is the emergency aid exception.
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See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (holding that where an officer observes conduct that leads him or her
to reasonably believe that criminal activity may occur and that the person or persons the officer is observing may be
armed and dangerous, the officer is entitled to search the outer clothing of such persons to discover weapons to
protect him or herself or others in the area; these searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment despite the
absence of probable cause).
97 See id. (explaining the differing standards governing Terry stops and frisks and other searches under the Fourth
Amendment).
98 See Fern Lynn Kletter, Annotation, Necessity of Rendering Medical Assistance as Circumstance Permitting
Warrantless Entry or Search of Building or Premises, 58 A.L.R.6 TH 499 (explaining that warrantless entries into
private premises are “presumptively unreasonable unless they fit within one of the few specifically established
exceptions to the warrant requirement,” specifically, the exigent circumstances exc eption; the three situations that
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The Supreme Court adopted the emergency aid exception in 2006 when it decided
Brigham City v. Stuart. In this case, police officers responded to a call regarding a party at a
residence around 3:00 a.m.99 The officers entered the backyard and observed an altercation in the
kitchen by looking through a window.100 One of the officers observed the victim get hit in the
face and spit blood into the sink.101 The officers entered the house without a warrant—and
announced their presence—after observing the violence continue.102 The officers arrested the
respondents, and the respondents challenged the warrantless entry as unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.103 The Court considered “whether police may enter a home without a
warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is
seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” 104 The Court held that no warrant
is needed when officers have an “objectively reasonable” belief regarding persons seriously
injured or threatened with such injury to render aid. 105 An officer’s subjective intent or motive
does not matter when encountered with these situations.106
In 2009, the Supreme Court expanded the emergency aid exception in Michigan v.
Fisher.107 In this case, the officers responded to a disturbance call at a residence where a man

qualify as exigent circumstances are the hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, to prevent the destruction of evidence, and
to render emergency aid or assistance to a person believed to require immediate assistance). (Emphasis added).
99 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400-01 (2006).
100 See id. at 401.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 400.
105 See id. at 406 (holding that the officers’ entry and the manner of the officers’ entry were reasonable, and that “the
officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the
violence in the kitchen was just beginning” thus rationalizing the officers’ entry to prevent further harm to the
victim).
106 See id. at 404-05 (reasoning that it was irrelevant whether the officers’ subjective intent in entering the house was
to make an arrest or gather evidence, or to actually assist the victim and render aid because actions such as these are
“‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action’” (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
107 See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009).
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was “going crazy.”108 When the officers arrived, they found the household in “considerable
chaos.”109 Pertinent to the emergency aid exception, the officers saw blood on the hood of a
truck, clothing inside the truck, and on one of the doors to the house. 110 The officers could see
Fisher through the window screaming and throwing things with a cut on his hand. 111 Fisher
refused to answer the door, and when the officer tried to enter the house, Fisher pointed a gun at
the officer.112 The officers eventually arrested Fisher and he challenged the warrantless entry as
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.113 As seen in Stuart, here the Supreme Court held
that the officer’s entry into the house without a warrant was objectively reasonable to render
aid.114 Here the Supreme Court went further and held that, “Officers do not need ironclad proof
of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.”115
C. Community Caretaking
The emergency aid exception deals with emergencies that law enforcement officers face
in the line of duty. On the other hand, the community caretaking doctrine includes situations that
may not involve the emergencies that officers face daily. 116 The Fourth Amendment still applies
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See id. at 45.
See id.
110 See id. at 45-46.
111 See id. at 46.
112 See id.
113 See id. at 46-47.
114 See id. at 45, 49 (holding that the officers’ warrantless entry into the home via the emergency aid exception was
reasonable because the officers had an objectively reasonable belief “that Fisher had hurt himself (albeit nonfatally)
and needed treatment . . . or that Fisher was about to hurt, or had already hurt, someone else”).
115 See id. at 49 (reasoning that officers do not need “ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to
invoke the emergency aid exception” because if officers were required to have this much evidence to render aid to
people potentially in danger, then it would not meet public safety demands by replacing the Fourth Amendment’s
objectively reasonable inquiry with a hindsight determination that there was no emergency at the outset).
116 See Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. C HI . LEGAL F. 261,
272 (1998) (outlining activities that law enforcement officers encounter daily under their “community caretaking”
function, including: “the mediation of noise disputes, the response to complaints about stray and injured animals,
and the provision of assistance to the ill or injured”).
109
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when officers perform their “watchman’s role” in non-emergency situations.117 To work around
the warrant requirement in community caretaking situations, the Supreme Court and Circuit
Courts of Appeals have adopted a reasonableness approach as they have in other Fourth
Amendment warrant cases.118
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski in 1973 set out the community
caretaking doctrine relating to vehicle searches.119 In Cady, a Chicago police officer got into a
car accident in Wisconsin while driving drunk. 120 The Wisconsin officers brought the Chicago
officer to the police station for questioning and arrested him for drunk driving. 121 One of the
Wisconsin officers searched the car’s front seat to see if the Chicago officer’s service revolver
was in there.122 The officer could not find it, and the car was impounded.123 After the Chicago
officer was formally arrested and the car was impounded, one of the Wisconsin officers returned
to the car to search for the revolver again. 124 During the second search, the Wisconsin officer
found a flashlight with blood on it in the front seat, and police uniform trousers, a nightstick, a
raincoat, a car floor mat, and a towel, all with blood on them in the trunk. 125 The police then
went to the farm where the Chicago officer said he was and found the victim’s body.126
The Supreme Court held that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to search the
vehicle for the revolver while performing his community caretaking purpose, not for his

117

See id. at 275 (explaining that even though police officers encounter these issues that are not emergencies on a
daily basis, their actions have to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to justify their conduct wit hout
warrants, such as entering a commercial premise that was “left open at night to secure the property”).
118 See id. at 297 (explaining that Fourth Amendment reasonableness has been applied by the Supreme Court in
community caretaking cases and other public health and safety contexts (citing Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387
U.S. 523, 539 (1967)).
119 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
120 See id. at 435-36.
121 See id. at 436.
122
See id.
123
See id.
124 See id. at 436-37.
125 See id. at 437 (explaining that the bloody car floor mat was still moist).
126 See id. at 437-38.
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investigative purposes.127 The officer’s “concern for the safety of the general public who might
be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle” while the vehicle
was neither in police nor the owner’s custody, nor on the owner’s premises was reasonable.128
The Supreme Court limited its holding to automobile searches because of the Court’s “previous
recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling places.”129
In the decades following the Cady decision, a circuit split has developed in the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals on whether to extend the community caretaking doctrine to the
home.130 The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have expanded the community caretaking
doctrine to pertain to home searches.131 On the other hand, the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have declined to extend the community caretaking doctrine to the home. 132 The main
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See id. at 448.
See id. at 447.
129 See id. at 447-48.
130 See generally Bernard J. Farber, Home Searches and the Community Caretaking Doctrine, 2011 (1) AELE M O.
L. J. 101 (2011) (outlining the community caretaking doctrine’s application in the Supreme Court and the
developing circuit split in the Federal Circuit Courts since the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski on
whether to extend community caretaking doctrine warrantless searches from automobiles to the home).
131 See United States v. York, 895 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the officers’ warrantless entry
into York’s home after being called by another member of the household was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because the officers were performing their community caretaking function, “totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation o f a criminal statute” (quoting Cady, 413
U.S. at 441)); see also United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1522 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the officers’
warrantless entry into a home was reasonable to perform their community caretaking function to abate on going
noise nuisances in residential neighborhoods); see also United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir.
2006) (holding that the officer acted in his community caretaking function and his warrantless entry into the
residence was reasonable because the door to the residence was open, the lights and television were on, and the
officer saw a pair of legs on the floor with a shotgun protruding from beneath them); see also Caniglia v. Strom, 953
F.3d 112, 127 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that the commun ity caretaking doctrine applied and the officer’s warrantless
entry was reasonable because the officers had an objectively reasonable belief that the defendant was suicidal or
posed a risk of harm to others).
132 See United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208-09 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the community caretaking
doctrine does not apply to warrantless entries of warehouses, and the Court limited the use of the community
caretaking doctrine to automobiles); see also United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that an officer’s community caretaking function cannot justify a warrantless entry and search of a private residence);
see also United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the community caretaking ex ception
is only applicable in cases involving vehicle searches because the Supreme Court recognized a distinction between
searching a vehicle and searching a house in Cady v. Dombrowski); see also Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170,
177 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the community caretaking doctrine cannot justify the warrantless entry and search
of a home because of the Supreme Court’s distinction between the expectation of privacy in automobiles and
homes).
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point of contention with the community caretaking doctrine has been whether to expand to the
home or not, but there has also been a difficulty in differentiating between an officer performing
his or her law enforcement purpose or performing his or her community caretaking purpose. 133
On March 24, 2021 a First Circuit case, Caniglia v. Strom, was argued before the United
States Supreme Court.134 In this case, during an argument, Caniglia grabbed an unloaded
handgun and told his wife to shoot him, but instead, she left the house for the night.135 Caniglia’s
wife called the police department and asked an officer to accompany her to the house when she
could not contact her husband.136 The officers spoke to Caniglia, and he agreed to go to the
hospital for psychiatric evaluation because the ranking officer believed Caniglia was imminently
dangerous to himself and others.137 While Caniglia was in the hospital, his wife accompanied the
officers into the home—without a warrant—to retrieve the handguns that were in the house
despite Caniglia’s objections.138 Caniglia challenged the officers’ warrantless entry and seizure
of the handguns as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 139 Caniglia was unsuccessful,
and the First Circuit extended the community caretaking doctrine to the home by holding that the
officers’ warrantless searches and seizures were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
through the community caretaking doctrine.140 Caniglia appealed and the petition for certiorari
was granted by the Supreme Court on November 20, 2020. 141

See Livingston, supra note 116, at 302-03 (arguing that an officer’s community caretaking interest and law
enforcement interest are intertwined and that situations can implicate both, thus, it is difficult for courts to
differentiate between when an officer is acting in a community caretaking sphere t o justify reasonable conduct for a
warrantless entry).
134 See Lenese Herbert, “Possible cause”: Court seems poised to allow warrantless community caretaking entries
into the home, SCOTUSBLOG (March 28, 2021, 5:56 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/03/possible-causecourt-seems-poised-to-allow-warrantless-community-caretaking-entries-into-the-home/.
135 See Caniglia, 953 F.3d at 119 (1st Cir. 2020).
136 See id.
137 See id. at 119-20.
138 See id. at 120.
139 See id. at 121.
140 See id. at 133.
141 See Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 870 (2020).
133
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The Supreme Court needs to decide whether to extend the community caretaking doctrine
to the home.142 Counsel for Caniglia argued that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the sanctity
of the home,” and that absent exigency, warrantless entry into the home is unreasonable. 143
Counsel for Caniglia answered questions from the Court in the negative when asked about
whether certain community caretaking warrantless entries into the home should be allowed. 144 In
particular, Chief Justice Roberts asked whether officers should be able to enter a home to check
on an elderly woman who has been unreachable for some time. 145 Counsel for the police officers
argued that “the risk Caniglia posed to himself or his wife should have sufficed as a ‘potential’
harm where ‘the need to respond could be immediate.’”146 Justice Breyer cautioned the Court on
expanding the breadth of “‘reasonableness’ into the community caretaking exception.”147 A
ruling is expected by the summer, and it seems likely that the Court will extend the community
caretaking doctrine to the home.148
The main inquiry that courts look at in most Fourth Amendment warrant cases is whether
the officer’s actions were reasonable. Looking at both the community caretaking doctrine and the
emergency aid exception, if an officer can show that his or her conduct was objectively
reasonable in the given situation, then the officer may not need a warrant. 149
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See Herbert, supra note 134 (describing oral argument before the Supreme Court on March, 24, 2021, for
Caniglia v. Strom).
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See Livingston, supra note 116 (explaining the reasonableness inquiry under the community caretaking doctrine);
see also Brigham City 547 U.S., supra note 99 at 406 (holding that in emergency aid situations an officer’s conduct
is examined under whether the conduct is objectively reasonable to justify the warrantless entry).
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D. Knock and Announce Doctrine and No-Knock Warrants
The Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to knock and announce their
presence and purpose before forcibly entering the premises to execute a search or arrest
warrant.150 However, objective reasonableness is a central focus in knock and announce cases
too.151 In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that the common-law knock and announce
doctrine is part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry and that the requirement to
knock and announce need not be inflexible thus, justifying no-knock warrant usage.152 Then, the
Supreme Court expanded permissible no-knock warrant usage in Richards v. Wisconsin.153 “To
justify a no-knock entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous, futile, or that
it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime . . .” 154 Generally, no-knock entries occur
when officers have already obtained a search or arrest warrant, and the magistrate allows the
officers to enter without knocking.155 While there is no bright-line rule stating the amount of time
officers need to wait before entering a dwelling after knocking and announcing their presence, an
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See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (stating that the common law of search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment required an officer to knock and announce his or her presence and authority be fore entering or
breaking the doors of a dwelling).
151 See id. at 929 (holding that the common law “‘knock and announce’ principle forms a part of the reasonableness
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment).
152 See id. at 934, 929 (holding that, “The Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be
read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.” Holding that
the knock and announce rule was not meant to be inflexible considering the circumstances of a situation where
officer safety is at risk, such as the circumstances of this case which involved informant testimony that Wilson
waived a pistol in her face confirming to the officers that Wilson had a gun and could pose safety issues for them).
153 See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 388-89 (1997) (stating the relevant facts of the case as the officers
obtaining a search warrant for Richards’ hotel room for drugs and paraphernalia and applying for authorization of a
no-knock warrant; when the officers went to the hotel room they announced their presence as they were breaking
down the door after Richards saw the officers and shut the door in their faces).
154 See id. at 394-95 (holding that although the Court rejected “Wisconsin’s blanket except ion to the knock-andannounce requirement,” the officers’ entry into Richards’ hotel room without knocking and announcing did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers had a reasonable belief that Richards would destroy evidence if
the officers had to announce their presence before entering).
155 See Micah Schwartzbach, Knock-and-Announce Rule and No-Knock Warrants, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/warrants-the-knock-notice-rule.html (explaining general knock and
announce and no-knock Fourth Amendment law).
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officer’s decision to enter after waiting a certain period of time is also examined under a
reasonableness standard.156
Despite the knock and announce requirement, there are no evidentiary consequences if
officers violate the knock and announce rule. In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court ruled
that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to the knock and announce rule.157 Thus, illegally
obtained evidence through a knock and announce violation cannot be suppressed at trial in
federal courts.158 However, some state courts have held that evidence illegally obtained through a
knock and announce violation must be suppressed.159 In Hudson, Justice Scalia gave three
grounds for not applying the exclusionary rule to knock and announce violations. First, there is
no “but for” causation in the knock and announce context. 160 Second, the causal link between the
knock and announce violation and the illegal search “is too attenuated to allow suppression.”161
Third, the social costs outweigh the deterrent benefits in applying the exclusionary rule in these
situations.162
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See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) (stating the relevant facts as the officers obtaining a search
warrant for drugs in Banks’ apartment; when they got to the apartment the officers knocked, announced their
presence, waited fifteen to twenty seconds, and after hearing no response they entered the apartment while Banks
was in the shower; the Court held that even though Banks was in the shower when the officers broke in, it was
reasonable for them to enter after waiting fifteen to twenty seconds because the off icers reasonably believed that
Banks could have been destroying the drug evidence).
157 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to knock
and announce violations because the interests that are viola ted in a knock and announce case “have nothing to do
with the seizure of evidence” since the knock and announce rule does not protect “one’s interest in preventing the
government from seeking or taking evidence described in a warrant”).
158 See Schwartzbach, supra note 155.
159 See id.
160 See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592 (reasoning that the knock and announce violation here by the officers was not a but for cause for obtaining the evidence, and that but-for causation is “only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for
suppression,” thus, the exclusionary rule should not apply to knock and announce violations).
161 See id. at 592-93 (reasoning that but-for causation or the causal link between the constitutional violation and the
seizure of evidence is too attenuated in knock and announce situations because “the interests protected by the knock and-announce requirement are different” from other situations where the exclusionary rule is necessary since the
knock and announce rule was not intended to shield “potential evidence from the government’s eyes”).
162 See id. at 599 (reasoning that “the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule to knock and announce violations
are considerable” while the deterrent benefit is also substantial, but the social costs outweigh deterring officers from
violating the knock and announce rule, thus the exclusionary rule should not apply to knock and announce
violations).
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No-knock warrants’ constitutionality can be connected to the exigent circumstances
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Law enforcement officers are
constitutionally allowed to enter premises without knocking and announcing in situations that
would lead to the potential destruction of evidence.163 Officers are also allowed to enter without
knocking and announcing if officer safety would be compromised. 164 As stated above, one of the
recognized exigent circumstances exceptions is to avoid the destruction of evidence. 165 It can be
argued that no-knock warrants are enabled through the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement.
E. Permissible Use of Force Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment also permits officers to use deadly force in very limited
circumstances. When deadly force is used, it qualifies as a seizure subject to the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement.166 Reasonableness also depends on how the seizure is
carried out, thus implicating the use of deadly force. 167 In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme
Court held that “[w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to
others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force
to do so.”168 However, under the reasonableness inquiry, an officer’s use of deadly force is
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See Legal Information Institute, No-Knock Warrant, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/no-knock_warrant (defining no-knock warrants as “a search warrant authorizing
police officers to enter certain premises without first knocking and announcing the ir presence or purpose prior to
entering the premises,” and describing the rationalizations for the constitutionality of no -knock warrants in certain
limited situations including, preventing the destruction of evidence or when knocking and announcing would
“compromise the safety of the police or another individual”).
164 See id.
165 See Kletter, supra note 98.
166 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (finding that the use of deadly force by an officer qualifies as a
seizure because the officer has restrained the freedom of the person to walk away subjecting the use of deadly force
to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement).
167 See id. at 8 (finding that since one of the factors in determining reasonableness is the extent of the intrusion,
whether the use of deadly force is reasonable or not depends on how the seizure is carried out).
168 See id. at 3-4, 11 (holding that the Tennessee statute authorizing “the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of
all felony suspects” was unconstitutional and that under the facts of this case the officer’s use of deadly force in
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justified when the situation poses a “substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to
others.”169
IV.

The Juxtaposition Between the Fourth Amendment and the Defund the Police
Movement
A. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Defund the Police’s Goals
Defund the police wants to reimagine police tactics and how police officers perform their

duties.170 Along with cutting police budgets and reinvesting that money elsewhere, defunding the
police would limit peoples’ contact with police. 171 This would reduce stop-and-frisks and lowlevel offense enforcement, which add to the overcriminalization problem.172 Defund the police
wants to demilitarize the police too.173 This would ban police use of “military-grade armaments”
that are used against communities of color. 174 Lastly, both defund the police and Congress seek
to change police use of force tactics, such as banning chokeholds and banning the use of noknock warrants.175
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As discussed above in part II, many states and cities have passed laws in the past year
addressing police conduct and police oversight. 176 Some of these laws have addressed defunding
the police in various amounts.177 Others have addressed the defund the police movement’s issues
with police conduct, including restricting use of force and no-knock warrant usage.178 For
example, sixteen states have passed laws restricting neck restraints in use of force, five states
have restricted no-knock warrant usage, and ten states have mandated or funded body camera
usage by officers.179 Despite these measures taken by various states and cities, some activists and
the Black Lives Matter movement are not satisfied with these measures aimed at addressing
police conduct.180 Although activists, Black Lives Matter, and the defund the police movement
are more focused on taking money from police departments and reimagining policing, the Fourth
Amendment will still persist in governing permissible police conduct.
Some of the new laws that were passed address Fourth Amendment police conduct that
defund the police wants to address, such as no-knock warrants and use of force regarding neck
restraints.181 However, these laws may not always prevent tragic outcomes that continue to occur
in the aftermath of George Floyd’s death.182 Stevante Clark, a man who lost his brother in 2018
to a police shooting, has said, “People aren’t necessarily happy with the change they’re seeing,
because the same thing keeps happening.”183 Although incidents keep occurring that involve the
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police and people of color, these laws that actually regulate or alter police conduct under the
Fourth Amendment will most likely have a greater effect on police conduct than defunding the
police will. People want the police to be defunded or abolished, but these defunding efforts will
not solve issues regarding police use of force, Terry stops and frisks, no-knock warrants, and the
warrant requirement exceptions that are recognized under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Can Defund the Police Get Over this Fourth Amendment Hurdle?
As discussed above, many cities have taken steps to defund their police departments in
the past eleven months.184 These efforts have varied depending on the amount of money diverted
from the police budget or the number of employment cuts that have been made.185 However, the
Fourth Amendment still lurks in the background to regulate constitutional officer conduct. 186
Even with all of the positive steps to defund police departments throughout the country,
eliminating police funding or the number of employed officers will not alter police conduct
under the Fourth Amendment. Police officers may be more cognizant of their conduct pertaining
to racial inequality given the events that occurred in 2020 and 2021 but at the end of the day,
taking money or officers away from these departments will not change what officers can and
cannot do under the Fourth Amendment.
As discussed above in part III, law enforcement officers do not need search or arrest
warrants in certain emergency and non-emergency situations. If an officer’s conduct in an
emergency situation is objectively reasonable, then an officer does not need a warrant to enter a
dwelling to render aid.187 Additionally, if an officer is conducting his or her community
caretaking function, he or she does not need a search warrant to enter a vehicle or dwelling—in
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some jurisdictions—if his or her conduct is reasonable.188 The community caretaking doctrine
also applies to a police officer’s “watchman’s role” that may not necessarily pertain to vehicles
or dwellings.189 Reasonableness plays a huge role in whether an officer’s conduct is
constitutional or unconstitutional in many different situations under the Fourth Amendment.
To remedy racial inequality in police conduct, Congress or the United States Supreme
Court must confront this Fourth Amendment roadblock. If the Fourth Amendment or its Supreme
Court precedent remains unchanged, then officers can continue to carry out their duties in the
current manner. It is unlikely that the Fourth Amendment will be changed by Congress but
Congress could pass laws to alter police conduct instead. The “George Floyd Justice in Policing
Act” is one example.190 This law would “ban the use of deadly force by federal law enforcement
. . . except as a last resort to prevent imminent and serious bodily injury.” 191 However, these
efforts stalled in the Senate in June 2020 when the Senate introduced a competing bill. 192 As the
George Floyd Justice in Policing Act has been debated in Congress, it has also been opposed by
M4BL.193 M4BL has argued that the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act does not go far
enough and “doubles down on reform strategies that have historically failed to center
marginalized communities and address police violence nationwide . . .” 194
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At the local and state level, activists are happy with new laws aimed at halting police
misconduct.195 However, many of these laws have been implemented “in states and cities
controlled by Democrats,” which has led to fear that these changes could be “offset in
Republican jurisdictions that are proposing to expand police protections.” 196 At the local and
state level there will be a lack of consistency between legal and illegal police conduct from stateto-state or city-to-city. This makes the Fourth Amendment, Congress’s efforts, and potential
future Supreme Court decisions very important in governing constitutional and unconstitutional
police conduct at large.
Regardless of how Congress proceeds, the Supreme Court’s current composition could
make it unlikely for it to overturn any Fourth Amendment case law for decades to come.197 There
is a firm conservative majority on the bench after the addition of Justice Amy Coney Barrett. 198
A fairly balanced bench with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg leaning left and Chief Justice John
Roberts acting as the swing vote has transformed dramatically since Justice Barrett’s addition.199
It is undeniable that defunding the police has legitimate benefits that address racial
inequality issues that have plagued this country for centuries. Unfortunately, this is likely only
the first step to achieve true equality. The Fourth Amendment will continue to be an enabler for
questionable police conduct in both emergency and non-emergency situations unless Congress or
the Supreme Court makes a monumental decision.
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